JFK-Chief Justice Controversy
Samuel Alfred Olivant, Esq. Oct11, 2026
Introduction
The committal of Joseph Fitzgerald Kamara (JFK) to Pademba Road Prison on 8 October 2026 raises a question far greater than the confrontation between alawyer and the Chief Justice of Sierra Leone. It strikes at the heart ofconstitutional governance: how far may a court go in defending its authoritybefore the exercise of that authority itself demands the closest scrutiny?
With the greatest respect to the Bench, three fundamental principles mustremain beyond dispute: judicial authority is not judicial infallibility; fearlessadvocacy is not, without more, contempt of court; and criticism of judicialconduct, however
unwelcome, must not automatically be equated with an attack on theadministration of justice.
No lawyer stands above the law, and no advocate enjoys immunity fromlegitimate disciplinary or contempt proceedings by virtue of seniority, politicalprominence or former public office. Equally, however, the power to deprive aperson of liberty for contempt— particularly through summary proceedings—must be exercised with scrupulous regard for due process, proportionality and therequirements of a fair hearing. Where the alleged contempt arises from wordsdirected at the very judge who invokes that power, the need for proceduralfairness and demonstrable impartiality becomes especially compelling.
This is not an argument for judicial weakness, nor an invitation to undermine the dignity of the Supreme Court. It is an argument for judicial power exercised within the law. The authority of a constitutional court is not diminished when itsdecisions are subjected to principled legal scrutiny; rather, public confidence inthe judiciary depends upon the assurance that even its most formidable powersare exercised according to established legal standards.
I write as a member of the Bar who recognises and respects the constitutionaloffice of the Chief Justice. I do not seek to impugn the integrity of any judicialofficer, prejudge disputed facts or excuse conduct that the law properly regardsas
contemptuous. My concern is narrower, but fundamental: whether the
circumstances surrounding JFK’s committal satisfied the legal and procedural
safeguards governing the exercise of the power to punish for contempt.
That question cannot responsibly be answered by emotion, political allegiance or personal loyalty to either the advocate or the Bench. It must be answered by the applicable law, the established principles of natural justice, the requirements of judicial impartiality and, ultimately, the authoritative record of what occurred.
The central issue, therefore, is not whether the courts must command respect. They must. It is whether the defence of judicial authority in this case wasconducted in a manner consistent with the very rule of law that the judiciary existsto uphold.
What Reportedly Happened
The confrontation arose during the Supreme Court’s hearing of the challengeto the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, in which JFK reportedlyappeared as lead counsel. The account below is drawn from press reports. Atthe time of writing, the official record has not been published, and the reportsdiffer on certain material details.
JFK reportedly objected that the Attorney-General’s Office had not properlyfiled its Statement of Case. During the ensuing exchange, he remarked that theChief Justice was“showing his hand too early.”The Chief Justiceresponded:“Mind your language, this court is not a political theater.”JFKmaintained that he was citing the law, not engaging in politics, and the ChiefJustice cannot talk to him like that, and asked to be permitted to present hiscase. The Court reportedly stood down briefly before allowing the substantivehearing to continue.
JFK subsequently gave a media interview in which he reportedly defended his conduct as consistent with the adversarial system of justice.
The following day, according to press accounts, the Chief Justice raised thematter in court, described the previous day’s remarks as gravely degrading tothe President of the Court, and directed JFK to apologise and retract his words,warning that
failure to do so could lead to contempt proceedings and possible restriction of his audience before the Court.
JFK reportedly apologised, explaining that his conduct was motivated by his dutyto
his client and his defence of the Constitution. Following a recess ofapproximately 1 5 minutes, he reportedly apologised again. The Chief Justiceconsidered the apology insufficiently sincere, directed JFK to remove his wig andenter the dock, and ordered that he be taken to Pademba Road Prison. Furtherproceedings were
reportedly adjourned to a later date.
Where a person’s liberty has been taken away through contemptproceedings,
accuracy about the facts and precision about the applicable law are notoptional;
they are indispensable to determining whether the power was lawfullyexercised.
The constitutional framework in Sierra Leone
The Constitution of Sierra Leone, (Act No. 6 of 1 991 ) expressly recognisescontempt as a lawful ground for deprivation of liberty. But it recognises it withina structure of rights, not as an exception to them.
1. Section 1 7(1 )(c) permits deprivation of liberty, “as may be authorised bylaw”, in execution of an order of the High Court, Court of Appeal orSupreme Court on the grounds of contempt. The power exists; thequalifier “as may be authorised by law” means it must be exercisedaccording to law.
2. Section 1 7(2)(a) requires that any person arrested or detained beinformed in writing, or in a language he understands, of the facts andgrounds of his detention, at the time and in any event within twenty-fourhours.
3. Section 23(1 ) guarantees anyone charged with a criminal offence afair hearing by an independent and impartial court.
4. Section 23(4) and (5) guarantee the presumption of innocence and theright to be informed in detail of the nature of the charge, to adequate timeand facilities to prepare a defence, and to be represented by a legalpractitioner of one’s choice.
5. Section 25(2) permits limits on freedom of expression for maintaining the
authority and independence of the courts, but only so far as they are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
The decisive link is that criminal contempt is treated in our law as a criminalmatter. In (1 964– 66) ALR (SL) 557, the Court of Appeal held that acommittal for criminal contempt amounts to a conviction. The Supreme Courtendorsed that view in [1 992] SLSC 1 . If committal is aconviction,
then the guarantees of section 23 are engaged, and summary procedure must be
reconciled with them rather than allowed to displace them.
There is a further structural point. When the summary power is exercised by atrial court, an appellate court stands behind it. When it is exercised by theSupreme Court, presided over by the Chief Justice, there is no higher domesticcourt to review the order. The absence of an appellate safety net is not a licencefor informality. It is the strongest possible reason for meticulous observance ofthe safeguards at the first and only stage.
Fair criticism and contempt: the common-law line
The common law has always drawn a line between conduct that obstructs justice and words that merely wound judicial pride. The leading authorities place that linein the same place.
[1900] 2 QB 36 confirmed that scandalising the court is a recognisedform of contempt; the editor in that case was in fact convicted for scurrilouspersonal abuse of a judge. But Lord Russell CJ was careful to add thatreasonable argument or expostulation against a judicial act, as contrary to law orthe public good, is no contempt at all. is therefore authority for bothpropositions: abuse may be punished, criticism may not.
In [1936] AC 322, the Privy
Council set aside a contempt conviction arising from published criticism of sentencing. Lord Atkin’s statement that justice is not a cloistered virtue hasbecome the classic expression of the principle that courts must toleraterespectful, even outspoken, comment, provided it is made in good faith andwithout imputing improper motives.
In [1 968] 2 QB
1 50, Lord Denning MR explained that the English courts would not use the contempt jurisdiction to uphold their own dignity, because their authority restson surer foundations. The point is not that judges must endure anything. It isthat the purpose of contempt is to protect the administration of justice, not thefeelings of the individual judge.
Two further authorities frame what counsel was entitled to raise.
[1 924] 1 KB 256 established that justice must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. [2001 ] UKHL67,
[2002] 2 AC 357 settled the modern test for apparent bias: whether a fair-minded
and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. A submission that a court appears to have prejudged an issue is, in principle, the raising of exactly that question.
None of this licenses counsel to address the Bench in any manner they choose. It establishes the starting point: the question is never simply whether words were disrespectful, but whether they interfered, or were calculated to interfere, with the due administration of justice.
Due process in summary contempt
The procedural requirements for summary committal are not foreign imports.They are settled Sierra Leonean law.
In (1 970– 71 ) ALR (SL), Cr. App. No. 1 8/70, Sir Samuel BankoleJones P, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, stated two conditionsthat every summary committal must satisfy. First, the judge must make theperson aware of the pith of the charge. Second, the person must be given anopportunity to show cause why he should not be committed, whether by excuse, explanation or correction of any misapprehension about what was said or done.The Court added that unless this opportunity is given, the committal is unlawful.
The Supreme Court applied that passage in
[1 992] SLSC 1 . A witness had been sent to Pademba Road by a commission of inquiry without being heard; the Court, presided over by Kutubu CJ, quashed the order on certiorari and directed her immediate release, holding that a decision reached in breach of the rule that no one should be condemned unheard couldnot stand. The parallel with the present facts in name and place is coincidental;the principle is not.
The common-law lineage is long. (1 868) LR 2 PC 1 06 establishedthat no one should be punished for contempt without a specific charge and an opportunity to answer it. In , a
barrister was committed for seven days by the judge before whom he was appearing. The Privy Council set the committal aside because the judge had not identified the specific contempt with sufficient particularity ([1 977] 1 All ER 41 1 ),and then held that this failure deprived him of liberty without due process underthe Constitution, entitling him to redress ( [1 979] AC 385).
Finally, [1 975] QB 73 confines the summarypower
to cases where it is urgent and imperative to act immediately to protect the proceedings. Where the court can continue, and has in fact continued, theordinary course is to refer the matter for proper proceedings rather than to try andpunish it on the spot.
Measured against these authorities, four questions arise on the reported facts.
• Was a specific charge formulated? The reports describe a demand to apologise, followed by a finding that the apology was insincere. They donot show a charge identifying which words, on which day, constitutedthe contempt.
• Was there a hearing on that charge? The reported hearing on apology and bail did not proceed. An opportunity to apologise is not the same thing asan opportunity to show cause.
• Was immediate action necessary? The Court had itself allowed the substantive hearing to continue on 7 October. That choice is difficultto reconcile with the urgency that alone justifies summarycommittal.
• Were the section 1 7(2) requirements met? Whether JFK received written grounds of detention within twenty-four hours is a matter the recordshould disclose.
When the judge is also the offended party
The most delicate feature of this case is that the remark complained of wasdirected at the Chief Justice personally, and it was the Chief Justice whodetermined that it was contemptuous, rejected the apology and ordered thecommittal. The maxim that no one should be a judge in his own cause, , does not disappear because the cause is contempt.
The clearest modern authority is (Grand Chamber, Application
No. 73797/01 , 1 5 December 2005). A senior advocate, interrupted during
cross-examination in a murder trial, protested to the bench in heated terms. After short breaks, the same judges convicted him of contempt and sentenced him tofive days’ imprisonment, enforced immediately. The Grand Chamber found aviolation of the right to an impartial tribunal: the judges had combined the roles ofcomplainant, witness, prosecutor and judge, and their own language showedthey had made up their minds before hearing him. It also found the immediatecustodial sentence
disproportionate, noting that less drastic measures such as admonition or a
disciplinary referral were available.
The United States Supreme Court reached comparable conclusions under itsown due-process clause. In , 348 U.S. 1 1 (1 954), it setaside a lawyer’s contempt conviction and directed a rehearing before adifferent judge, because the trial judge had become personally embroiled withcounsel. In
, 400 U.S. 455 (1 971 ), concerning a defendant who had grossly insulted the trial judge, it held that a judge so vilified should not sit in judgment on the contempt after trial. And in , 381 U.S. 1 31 (1 965), it reversedthe contempt convictions of lawyers who had alleged, in a motion for change ofvenue, that the trial judge was biased; raising judicial bias through proper legalchannels could not, of itself, be punished as contempt.
These decisions do not bind Sierra Leonean courts, and the American casesarise under a different constitutional text. But they are persuasive for a simplereason: they apply a principle that our own Constitution states in section 23(1 ),the guarantee of an impartial court. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002), which Commonwealth judiciaries have widely endorsed, point the sameway, requiring a judge to stand aside where a reasonable observer might doubthis ability to decide impartially.
The practical alternatives were real. The Chief Justice could have referred thematter to a differently constituted panel of the Court, to the General Legal Councilfor
disciplinary consideration, or to the Attorney-General for ordinary proceedings. Any of these would have vindicated the Court’s authority without exposing itsorder to the charge that the affronted judge had sat in his own cause.
Was the remark itself contempt?
Honesty requires saying that the remark was ill-judged. To tell a presiding judge,in open court, that he is “showing his hand too early” is to suggest prejudgment, and in a case of acute political sensitivity that suggestion carries weight. Counselof JFK’s experience will know that an objection to apparent bias should be madeformally, with grounds, and in measured language, not as an aside in the heat ofargument.
On that, the Bench was entitled to rebuke him, and did.
But rebuke and imprisonment are different responses to different wrongs. Several features of the context point away from punishable contempt.
• It was made in the course of a legal submission. The remark accompaniedan
objection about compliance with the Rules by the Attorney-General’sOffice, a matter plainly within counsel’s duty to raise.
• It concerned the appearance of fairness, not the judge’s private character. It imputed no corruption or personal dishonesty. Its substance, if crudely expressed, was an apparent-bias concern of the kind invites.
• The Court did not treat it as an obstruction at the time. Proceedings
continued. The matter was revived the next day, after the media interview.
• It was withdrawn. On the reported facts, JFK apologised.
That last sequence raises a question of its own. If what moved the Court on 8 October was the interview rather than the courtroom remark, the allegedcontempt changes character. Out-of-court comment by counsel engages section25 of the Constitution and the line of authority far more directly, and it isprecisely the kind of matter that calls for a written charge and a proper hearingrather than summary disposal.
There is, however, one version of the facts that would change the analysis. If JFKdid refuse a direct order of the Court to remove his wig and enter the dock, thatrefusal is itself capable of being contempt, independent of anything said on 7October.
Disobedience of a lawful judicial direction in the face of the court is the paradigm case for the summary power. Even then, would require that thecharge be put and that he be heard on it.
The apology and the committal
An apology does not automatically purge a contempt, and a court is entitled tojudge whether contrition is genuine. That is settled. But the law asks what anapology is for. In contempt, the object is to restore respect for the court’sauthority and to secure the proper continuation of proceedings. Where counselhas twice apologised and withdrawn the offending words, and the hearing canproceed, the case for a custodial response becomes very hard to make out.treats immediate imprisonment of an advocate, where admonition or disciplinaryreferral would suffice, as disproportionate.
The manner of the committal also deserves comment. Directing a senioradvocate
to remove his wig and enter the dock is not merely a procedural step. In ourtradition the wig marks counsel’s standing as an officer of the court; its removalbefore the Bar and the public carries a symbolic weight that a court exercisingrestraint would weigh carefully, particularly before any charge has been formallydetermined.
The record, when available, should answer the following.
1. What exactly was the contempt? The remark of 7 October, the media interview, the perceived insincerity of the apology, or the refusal of adirection on 8 October.
2. What is the legal character of the detention? Is it punishment upon a finding
of contempt, which treats as a conviction, or custody pending determination of a charge yet to be tried? Each carries different consequences, including for bail.
3. What procedural safeguards were afforded? A written charge, anopportunity to show cause, time to prepare, and representation by counselof his choice, as section 23(5) requires.
4. Was recusal or referral considered? Given the Chief Justice’spersonal involvement, was any thought given to another panel oranother forum?
5. Were less restrictive measures considered? Admonition, anundertaking, restriction of audience, or referral to the General LegalCouncil.
Without the formal order, the full transcript and the stated legal basis, it wouldbe premature to conclude that the Chief Justice acted unlawfully, just as itwould be premature to conclude that JFK’s conduct could not amount tocontempt. What is legitimate, and indeed necessary, is to ask whether the legalthreshold and the procedural safeguards were met. Asking that question is notan attack on the judiciary. It is how a mature legal system holds all its officers,on the Bench and at the Bar, to the same law.
What the Bar owes in return
A defence of the Bar’s independence that says nothing about the Bar’sobligations is only half an argument. The United Nations Basic Principles on theRole of Lawyers
(1 990) protect advocates from penal sanction for relevant statements made ingood faith in their professional appearances before a court. The same Principlesrequire lawyers to uphold the law and the recognised standards of the professionat all times.
For counsel, the lessons of this episode are plain. An allegation of apparent biasis
among the gravest submissions an advocate can make. It should be made byformal application, supported by grounds, and couched in language thataddresses the appearance of justice rather than the person of the judge. Mattersarising in court are best answered in court, not in the media while proceedingsare live. And seniority enlarges, rather than reduces, the duty of restraint,because younger members of the Bar take their cue from those who lead them.
Fearless advocacy and courteous advocacy are not opposites. The finestadvocates of our tradition have been both.
Conclusion
Judicial independence is a constitutional necessity; judicial infallibility is a legal fiction. Respect for the Bench does not preclude scrutiny of judicial conduct, justas fearless advocacy does not excuse discourtesy or contempt.
The power to commit for contempt is an essential safeguard of the administrationof justice. Precisely because it is so formidable, Sierra Leonean law, from
to, has insisted that it be exercised only upon a specific charge,after a
genuine opportunity to answer, and only where nothing less will do. Comparative authority from toadds a further caution: the judge who is the objectof the alleged contempt should, wherever possible, leave its determination to another.
When the matter returns on 1 3 October, the Court has an opportunity that serves everyone’s interest: to state the precise charge, to hear counsel on it, to consider whether the apologies already given suffice, and, if any punishment is warranted,to choose the least restrictive measure that will protect the Court’s authority. Acourse of that kind would not diminish the Bench. It would demonstrate the veryqualities on which its authority rests.
The dignity of the Bench must be preserved and the independence of the Bar protected, and both must remain subject to the Constitution. The true strength of judicial authority lies not in the power to punish, but in the fairness, impartialityand restraint with which that power is exercised.
Samuel Alfred Olivant, Esq
LLM, BL
LEGAL CONSULTANT
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER
INFORMATION SECURITY COMPLIANT EXPERT UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA
